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WHY NEWARK?
The Ames Moot Court Room at Harvard Law School was packed
on a Friday night in September 1969. An overflow crowd rallied for
the Chicago Eight. Professor Arthur Kinoy, defendant John Froines,
and Tom Hayden’s defense attorney Leonard Weinglass reported on
the courtroom confrontation that was front-page news every day. T-

* George W. Conk is an Adjunct Professor of Law and Senior Fellow of the Stein
Center for Law & Ethics at Fordham Law School. He entered Rutgers Law School
in 1970 and graduated in January 1974, having taken leave the fall of 1972 to
volunteer in the Indochina Peace Campaign and the McGovern campaign. This
Essay is dedicated to the professors of Rutgers Newark School of Law who trained
me, the lawyers of the New Jersey Office of the Public Defender whose inspired,
dogged work brought the repeal of the death penalty—the greatest accomplishment
of our generation of New Jersey lawyers, and to my dear, late friend Louise A.
Halper, ’73, who guided me in my quest to become a law teacher.
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shirts and buttons saying “Join The Conspiracy” sold quickly. A
motley crew of anti-war movement and “Black Power” leaders were
charged with conspiracy to cross state lines to incite a riot at the 1968
Chicago Democratic Convention. ““ Kinoy’s stem-winder roused the
young crowd—and me, fresh from two years in the Peace Corps in
India and a graduate student of radical historian Howard Zinn. Like
many other young activists—male and female—I changed course and
applied to Rutgers-Newark, somewhere across the Rubicon in New
Jersey. Kinoy had promised nights in the library until midnight,
fighting to protect the “most fundamental principles, now under
attack.” We weren’t disappointed.1
Three great shifts were underway, and Newark’s legal community
and Rutgers Law School were at the heart of it all. African
Americans’ demands for an end to poverty and discrimination, the
anti-war movement, and the women’s liberation movement
converged. Civil rights and liberties were the long-standing focus of
three leading civil rights movement lawyers—Professor Arthur
Kinoy, William Kunstler, and Morton Stavis. They were experienced
and successful advocates who frequently and sometimes with
spectacular success had represented civil rights workers in the south
and before the U.S. Supreme Court.2 They founded the Law Center
for Constitutional Rights (CCR), which had its first office on
Branford Place, across the street from Hobbie’s deli, a pastrami
palace that fed much of Newark’s bar.3
In the middle and late 1960s, disappointment with the slow pace of
change—particularly economic change—led African Americans to
join a series of civil disturbances—urban riots—mostly in major cities.
Prompted in part by Urban Renewal projects (often criticized as

1. For a contemporary account by a New York Times journalist who covered the
conspiracy trial, see J. ANTHONY LUKAS, THE BARNYARD EPITHET AND OTHER
OBSCENITIES: NOTES ON THE CHICAGO CONSPIRACY TRIAL (1970); see also JOHN
SCHULTZ, THE CHICAGO CONSPIRACY TRIAL (1972); Douglas Linder, The Chicago
available
at
Conspiracy
Trial
(2007)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1029397.
2. In Hamer v. Campbell, Stavis successfully represented civil rights movement
legend Fannie Lou Hamer in an attack on the Mississippi poll tax and the four-month
registration requirement. See 358 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1966). Kinoy and Kunstler
represented civil rights worker James Dombrowski in a landmark case enjoining the
bad faith prosecution of the activist by Louisiana under its Subversive Activities and
Communist Control Law. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
3. The Law Center, relocated in 1971 to New York and renamed the Center for
Constitutional Rights, remains an important progressive public interest law firm. See
CENTER FOR CONST. RIGHTS, http://ccrjustice.org (last visited Mar. 12, 2013).
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“Negro removal” projects) that cleared large residential areas, the
disturbances in Newark were particularly severe. The state National
Guard patrolled the streets, and there were deaths and widespread
property damage.4 Rutgers Law School’s new building had itself
sparked controversy in and out of the school as protesters demanded
jobs for African American and Latino construction workers.5
African American law students—who had been recruited—staged
a dramatic protest that led to the establishment of a committee with
the extravagant name “The Tripartite Commission.” There, faculty
members, African American students, and others met to discuss the
law school’s role in the current crisis. The results would shape
Rutgers Law School: a Minority Student Program was created.6
“Poverty law,” civil rights and liberties, women’s rights,
employment discrimination, and public education were the foci of
legal education at Rutgers-Newark. In the late 1960s and 1970s,
Rutgers-Newark—which we affectionately called People’s Electric—
presented a model of engaged legal education that was and is unique.
To my knowledge, no other law school has been so thoroughly
characterized by a broad progressive social agenda.
Rutgers-Newark changed the profile of who became lawyers: the
school was far ahead of the curve in admitting women. In 1971 the
entering class was 40% women, the second largest percentage in the
country.7 The influx of women was part of an epochal nationwide
transition that saw women go from 11% of entering law students in
1969 to nearly 37% in 1975.8 Begun in 1968, its affirmative action
program brought many minority students to the school. The Minority
Student Program provided mentoring, internship and other guidance
to minority students and later expanded these services to nonminorities from poor families).

4. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (THE KERNER
REPORT) chs. 1–2 (1967), available at http://www.blackpast.org/?q=primary/nationaladvisory-commission-civil-disorders-kerner-report-1967 [hereinafter THE KERNER
REPORT].
5. Alfred W. Blumrosen, Forty Five Years Near Broad Street: A Memoir of
Rutgers Law School, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 777, 804–14 (1999).
6. PAUL TRACTENBERG, A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF RUTGERS LAW SCHOOL IN
NEWARK: OPENING A THOUSAND DOORS 51–60 (2010).
7. Diane Crothers, The Origins of the Women’s Rights Law Reporter in the
Civil Rights and Women’s Liberation Movements, 31 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 190, 196
(2010).
8. See FRED STREBEIGH, EQUAL: WOMEN RESHAPE AMERICAN LAW 17 (2009).
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As chronicled by some of its key professors, the history of RutgersNewark is one of which the law school is proud.9
IMPACT LITIGATION
There were opportunities in Newark for all who were caught up in
the excitement of the times—the civil rights movement, the War on
Poverty, the rise of “women’s liberation,” and, of course, opposition
to the war in Vietnam. In the mid-1960s, a faculty assembled at
Rutgers-Newark that would make great innovations in legal
education—clinical education by professors who conceived of and
built the school as a law-reform institution.10
Frank Askin
Alfred Blumrosen
Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Willard Heckel
Arthur Kinoy
John M. Payne
Annamay Sheppard
Alfred Slocum
Nadine Taub
Paul Tractenberg11

9. See, e.g., Frank Askin, The Origins of the People’s Electric Law School,
SCH.
L.
NEWARK,
http://www.law.newark.rutgers.edu/publicRUTGERS
service/people-s-electric-law-school (last visited Mar. 12, 2013); see generally
TRACTENBERG, supra note 6 (chronicling the first one hundred years of Rutgers
School of Law at Newark, including the history of the Minority Student Program).
Rutgers reports that to date, 2,500 students have graduated from the program.
Minority
Student
Program,
RUTGERS
SCH.
L.
NEWARK,
http://law.newark.rutgers.edu/admissions-financial-aid/minority-student-program
(last visited Mar. 12, 2013).
10. Frank Askin, A Law School Where Students Don’t Just Learn the Law; They
Help Make the Law, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 855, 857 (1999); see also History, RUTGERS
SCH. L. NEWARK, http://law.newark.rutgers.edu/clinics/history (last visited Mar. 12,
2013) (describing the clinical program and its history).
11. The group was composed of seven Jews, an African American, and a gay
white man whose sexual orientation was an open secret. In my years there, those
facts never occurred to me—save that Slocum was obviously a black man. (“Black,”
rather than Negro or African-American, was the dominant parlance of the day in
which “Black Power” was a popular slogan. Thus, the Left’s alternative to the
traditionally Black National Bar Association was the National Conference of Black
Lawyers—led for many years by Lennox Hinds, ’72, and Victor Goode, ’73.)
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The names of these key faculty—not to slight others—comprise an
honor roll of progressive lawyers. Their achievements are carved in
the law books, not the law reviews. Business did not interest them.
They were career teachers and litigators. Slocum, for example, was
an architect of the Minority Student program and a public servant as
New Jersey’s Public Advocate.12 They founded or led clinics, which
were the driving force of the People’s Electric. Their creed was not to
observe neutrally, but rather to make a difference—for legal, social,
and economic equality of all and particularly for African Americans
and Latinos; to advance the rights of women; and to expand and
protect the fundamental rights of speech, privacy, and due process of
law. They scrupulously held to certain basic precepts: a belief in the
integrity of the judiciary, confidence that reason could reach every
judge, and that the basic principles of our legal system were adequate
to the tasks before us.
The result was that Newark—not Berkeley, Cambridge, New
Haven, or Washington, D.C.—was the most exciting place to be a law
student or law professor in the mid-1960s to late 1970s. The Law
Center for Constitutional Rights began there. Rutgers-Newark Law
School was the most innovative, exciting, and effective American law
school in the 1960s and 1970s. The tension between the role of
lawyers as public persons—officers of the court and the standard
bearers of the rule of law—and lawyers as the facilitators of
commerce that has troubled the profession had little resonance at
Rutgers Law School. Education there was virtually free when I
enrolled. Law students were not troubled by the prospect of
burdensome debt.13 Although it had once been a huge proprietary
law school (2,335 students in the 1920s), it became part of the
University of Newark and in 1946 was absorbed into Rutgers
University. As employees of the State University of New Jersey, the
professors at Rutgers-Newark were salaried and assured of a pension

12. See Faculty Profile: Alfred Slocum, RUTGERS SCH. L. NEWARK,
http://law.newark.rutgers.edu/our-faculty/faculty-profiles/alfred-slocum (last visited
Mar. 12, 2013).
13. In my second year, I applied for and got a full scholarship. In my third year,
tuition doubled to $1,000. I kept the $500 scholarship. There was also a $60 student
activity fee. The total cost was $1,180 for three years. For a point of reference, in
1970, the tuition at Boston College Law School was $2,100 and Boston University
was $2,500. When I got my first job in 1976 as a lawyer and business representative
for Actors Equity Association, I made $13,500—six times one year’s tuition at B.C.
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by their eligibility for the public employees retirement system, and so
they had both security and academic freedom.14
IN TUNE WITH THE TIMES
Rutgers Law School reflected and joined the progressive
movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Primary among the driving forces
were the civil rights movement and the effort to overcome the
damage done by centuries of slavery and a century of the American
apartheid system called Jim Crow.15 The mass movement of African
Americans in the South attracted the support and devotion of
millions. The landmarks were the Civil Rights Act of 1964,16 the
Voting Rights Act of 1965,17 the Fair Housing Acts of 1968,18 and the
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.19 The last of these was the
enabling legislation for what Lyndon Johnson declared would be a
War on Poverty.20
In 1977 the great New Jersey judge and Supreme Court Justice
William J. Brennan, frustrated by the Supreme Court’s pulling back
from the expansionary mode of the Warren Court, lectured at
Harvard Law School:
[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the
full protections of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too,
are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending
beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
federal law. The legal revolution which has brought federal law to
the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective
force of state law—for without it, the full realization of our liberties
cannot be guaranteed.21

Rutgers Law professors had already recognized the need and
opportunity to utilize state constitutions.

14. TRACTENBERG, supra note 6, at 21–52.
15. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW
(1955) (offering an in-depth analysis of the origins and effects of the Jim Crow laws in
the South).
16. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat 241 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–2000h-6).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973aa-6 (1965).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (1968).
19. Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (1964).
20. ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: THE PASSAGE OF
POWER 538–45 (2012).
21. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
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Two of the lasting programs of that era were Community Legal
Services for the poor and the Headstart preschool programs (part of
the Community Action Programs). Educational equality and legal
protections for the poor were People’s Electric’s signature issues.
Annamay Sheppard, a left-leaning local lawyer and 1958 graduate
was one of the first to respond to the civil legal services programs22
that the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 enabled.23 Contrary to
those who would use the contemptuous Tory phrase “nanny state” to
dismiss these programs, the statute and the Office of Economic
Opportunity (OEO) headed by Sargent Shriver emphasized self-help
and economic development.24

22. Annamay T. Sheppard, Bricks, Mortar, Heart, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 971, 974
(1999).
23. For a synopsis of the program’s origins, see History: The Founding of the
LSC, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/about/what-is-lsc/history (last visited
Mar. 12, 2013). See also Economic Opportunity Act, supra note 19.
24. Programs developed because of the statute and the OEO to help achieve selfhelp and development include:
VOLUNTEERS IN SERVICE TO AMERICA (VISTA), which recruited, selected, trained,
and referred volunteers to state or local agencies or private nonprofit organizations
to perform duties in combating poverty;
THE JOB CORPS, which provided work, basic education, and training in separate
residential centers for young men and young women, ages sixteen to twenty-one;
NEIGHBORHOOD YOUTH CORPS, which provides work and training for young men
and women, ages sixteen to twenty-one, from impoverished families and
neighborhoods;
WORK STUDY, which provides grants to colleges and universities for part-time
employment of students from low-income families who need to earn money to pursue
their education;
URBAN AND RURAL COMMUNITY ACTION, which provided financial and technical
assistance to public and private nonprofit agencies for community action programs
developed with “maximum feasible participation” of the poor and giving “promise of
progress toward elimination of poverty”;
ADULT BASIC EDUCATION, which provides grants to state educational agencies for
programs of instruction for persons eighteen years and older whose inability to read
and write English is an impediment to employment;
VOLUNTARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY CHILDREN, which establishes an information
and coordination center to encourage voluntary assistance for deserving and needy
children;
LOANS TO RURAL FAMILIES, which provides loans not exceeding $2,500 that will
assist low-income rural families in permanently increasing their income;
ASSISTANCE FOR MIGRANT AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYEES, which provides assistance
to state and local governments, public and private nonprofit agencies or individuals in
operating programs to assist migratory workers and their families with housing,
sanitation, education, and day care of children;
EMPLOYMENT AND INVESTMENT INCENTIVES, which provided loans and guarantees,
not in excess of $25,000 to a single borrower, for the benefit of very small businesses;
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It is worth remembering, too, that President Lyndon B. Johnson
once said:
For so long as man has lived on this earth poverty has been his
curse. On every continent in every age men have sought escape
from poverty’s oppression. Today for the first time in all history of
the human race, a great nation is able to make and is willing to make
a commitment to eradicate poverty among its people.25

The Legal Services programs for the poor were part of the OEOfunded Rural and Urban Community Action Programs. One early
program was the Newark Legal Services Project, which was based in
the Law School. After serving as Deputy Director, Annamay
Sheppard joined the faculty as its third female member, along with
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Eva Hanks.26 With Prof. Richard Chused,
she soon became the co-director of the Urban Legal Clinic.27
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Ending school segregation in the south required more than just
wiping the Jim Crow laws from the books; it required affirmative
action.28 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 conditioned federal aid to local
schools in dismantling the dual school systems and bolstered the
courts that had been stymied by a decade of white southern defiance

WORK EXPERIENCE, which provided payments for experimental, pilot, and
demonstration projects to expand opportunities for work experience and needed
training of persons who are unable to support or care for themselves or their families,
including persons receiving public assistance.
See The 1964 Economic Opportunity Act, supra note 19.
25. Audiotape: Discussion Between President Johnson and Representative Phil
Landrum Pertaining to the Economic Opportunity Act (May 14, 1964), available at
http://whitehousetapes.net/clip/lyndon-johnson-phil-landrum-economic-opportunityact.
26. See STREBEIGH, supra note 8, at 13–14.
27. Sheppard, supra note 22, at 975. I earned 12 academic credits as a clinical
student in 1972. I tried and lost my first case—a retaliatory eviction defense of a
tenant leader. I did not understand that the bubble of the presumption of retaliatory
intent burst once rebuttal testimony had offered a non-discriminatory motive.
Absent evidence of hostile intent, my client’s claim failed. Richard Chused, a
professor at New York Law School, spent thirty-five years at Georgetown where he
explored the property law implications of decisions like Javins v. First National
Realty Corp. See Faculty Profile: Richard Chused, N.Y. L. SCH.,
http://www.nyls.edu/faculty/faculty_profiles/richard_chused/ (last visited Mar. 12,
2013).
28. See Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent, 391 U.S. 430, 437–38 (1968)
(holding that vestiges of school segregation must be eliminated “root and branch”).
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of the mandates of Brown v. Board of Education.29 Despite the
transition to formal equality, the situation of black people in the
north was troubled by the fact that centuries of discrimination left
millions of black people poor, ill-educated, and unprepared for the
new “cybernetic” economy, the shape of which could only be
glimpsed at the time. Rising expectations confronted legal, political,
and economic walls. Beginning with the Watts neighborhood in Los
Angeles, an era of urban disorders emerged. Cities burned and the
police and state national guard responded to suppress the bitter,
spontaneous uprisings.30 The phenomenon known as “white flight”
accelerated the city-suburb lines as a racial divide.31 The process had
long been underway. The iconic suburban developer William Levitt
followed an openly segregationist policy in his FHA-assisted tract
house developments.32
The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders was formed
shortly after the 1967 Newark riot, and its report on the causes of civil
disorders became known by the name of its chairman, former Illinois
Governor Otto Kerner.33 The Kerner Report stated its conclusions
plainly. The Commissioners placed the blame squarely on racism,
warning, “Our Nation Is Moving Toward Two Societies, One Black,
One White—Separate and Unequal.”34
The 1967 riots gave enormous impetus to the changes at Rutgers
Law School, which was located in downtown Newark, as it is now.
29. United States v. Jefferson Cnty., 380 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1967) (en banc)
(“[B]oards and officials administering public schools in this circuit have the
affirmative duty under the Fourteenth Amendment to bring about an integrated,
unitary school system in which there are no Negro schools and no white schools⎯just
schools. Expressions in our earlier opinions distinguishing between integration and
desegregation must yield to this affirmative duty we now recognize.”). Circuit Judge
John Minor Wisdom’s opinion relied on DHEW guidelines to impose rigid
desegregation requirements in schools in the deep south states of the old Fifth
Circuit. See Jefferson Cnty., 372 F.2d at 836.
30. See THE KERNER REPORT, supra note 4.
31. See, e.g., White Flight and Urban Riots, TEMPLE UNIV. & N. PHILA.,
http://www.urbanoasis.org/temple/?q=whiteflight (last visited Mar. 15, 2013).
32. See Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Div. Against Discrimination in the State Dept. of
Educ., 158 A.2d 177, 179 (N.J. 1960).
33. See THE KERNER REPORT, supra note 4.
34. Id. Its conclusion that racism was the main problem, fifteen years later,
yielded in the Reagan period to the conservative view that liberals’ support of uplift
and support programs had excused or enabled bad, self destructive behavior which
perpetuated poverty and independence. See, e.g., Stephan Thernstrom, The Kerner
Commission Report Lacks Credibility, Address Before the Heritage Foundation
(Mar. 13, 1998), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/the-kernercommission-report.
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The development of the new law school building, Ackerson Hall, also
sparked protests demanding that black workers be hired to work on
the project. Led by Professor Alfred Blumrosen, the University was
persuaded to side with the picketers and file a complaint with the
state Education Department’s Division on Civil Rights against the
contractors and trade unions asserting discrimination against African
American and Latino construction workers. The building was erected
and Rutgers’ commitment to affirmative action advanced.35
CLINICAL E DUCATION AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Rutgers-Newark’s emphasis on clinical education and affirmative
action began early. The postwar development toward greater
academic strength of “university law schools” disparaged the
programs that trained so many in the postwar years as mere trade
schools. Ending the night-school part-time program was a key
objective of Dean Lehan Tunks, who sought a “great full-time
university law school” after his 1953 appointment.36 In 1955, Tunks,
Associate Dean Willard Heckel, and Assistant Dean Malcolm Talbott
recruited two Michigan grads, Alfred Blumrosen and Clyde Ferguson.
Blumrosen had spent a couple of years in small firm practice in Ann
Arbor and regretted the lack of practical training at Michigan Law
School. Ferguson—recruited at the same AALS “meat market” as
was Blumrosen—had been an Assistant U.S. Attorney. He would
become the school’s first Black faculty member. The faculty was
“looking for professors to introduce what we now call ‘clinical’
educational experiences” recalls Blumrosen.37 It would be more than
a decade before the stars aligned to bring into being the practical
training and commitment to educating minority lawyers that made
Rutgers Newark the premier training ground of those who sought to
use the law as an “instrument of social change,” a phrase that often
came from our lips. The civil rights movement had shown that it was
possible and we sought to defend those gains, and advocates of
women’s liberation sought and expected similar broad gains.
Dean Willard Heckel,38 an early supporter of civil rights for
minorities and women, his longtime partner, law professor and later
35. See Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 804–14.
36. TRACTENBERG, supra note 6, at 39–42.
37. Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 779.
38. Heckel, a leading figure in the Presbyterian Church, is remembered in Alfred
W. Blumrosen, Willard Heckel and the Spirit of Rutgers Law School, 41 RUTGERS L.
REV. 48 (1989). See also C. Willard Heckel, 74, Ex-Law Dean, Dies, N.Y. TIMES,
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Rutgers-Newark Provost Malcolm Talbott, and other faculty of the
law school had made conscious efforts to “selectively” recruit black
students in the 1960s.39 Some of them went on to great prominence.
Through this approach, which was administered by Malcolm Talbott,
the school enrolled perhaps a dozen minority students between 1960
and 1968. Among them were two future Public Advocates,40 Alfred
A. Slocum, who also became the school’s third black law professor in
1970, and Stanley Van Ness.41 Important as those recruits were, the
faculty was not content to stop there; they also created a committee,
headed by Professor Frank Askin, whose objective was to develop a
“critical mass” of minority students. The decision was to expand the
student body to add twenty minority students the first year and forty
by the second year. Thus, the Rutgers Minority Student Program was
born, which would graduate almost 3,000 lawyers in the next thirtyone years.42
The faculty and the students responded, forming an extravagantly
named Tripartite Commission of three Black students, three SBA
Apr. 7 1988, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/07/nyregion/c-willard-heckel-74-ex-lawdean-dies.html.
39. See Bernard K. Freamon, The Origins of the Anti-Segregation Clause in the
New Jersey Constitution, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1267 (2004) (discussing Heckel’s role in
drafting of the New Jersey Constitution of 1947—a document which included strong
civil rights provisions and other progressive provisions). On Heckel’s support for
progressive positions, see TRACTENBERG, supra note 6, at 52; Elizabeth Langer,

Seizing the Moments: The Beginnings of the Women’s Rights Law Reporter and a
Personal Journey, 30 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 592 (2009).
40. The Department of the Public Advocate was created in 1974 in the
administration of Democrat Brendan T. Byrne. Frederick D. Murphy, Government
Under Glass, BLACK ENTERPRISE (July 1977), at 45, 45. Stanley Van Ness was the
first Public Advocate. Id. Republican Governor Christine Todd Whitman abolished
the Department in 1994. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27E-1–52:27E-15 (West 1994)
(repealed 1994). The Department was restored in 2005 by Democratic Governor
Richard Codey, and abolished again by Republican Governor Chris Christie. See N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 52:27EE-5 (West 2005) (repealed 2010). The Public Advocate
department included the Public Defender which was not abolished, nor was the
Division of Rate Counsel. See Learn About the Division, DIVISION RATE COUNSEL,
http://www.state.nj.us/rpa/about/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2013); OPD Structure, OFF.
PUB. DEFENDER, http://www.state.nj.us/defender/his_stru.shtml (last visited Mar. 15,
2013). Functions repealed include: Divisions of Advocacy for the Developmentally
Disabled, Mental Health Advocacy, Elder Advocacy, Child Advocate, and Public
Interest Advocacy.
41. See Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 814. The first black law professor at Rutgers
was Clyde Ferguson. See id. at 780.
42. Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 814–15. For a history of the Minority Student
Program, see Minority Student Program, RUTGERS SCH. L. NEWARK,
http://law.newark.rutgers.edu/admissions-financial-aid/minority-student-program
(last visited Mar.21, 2013).
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representatives, and three faculty members. Their May 1970 report,
“Strategy for Change,” would transform the school. They demanded
clinical education to train a “new breed of lawyers with deep roots in
the honored past of our profession who [we] would characterize as
people’s lawyers.”43 Dramatic changes in the law school’s curriculum
followed. A new required first year course was added called Legal
Representation of the Poor, which was the brainchild of Professor Eli
Jarmel. The course expressed the spirit of the times. Professor Paul
Tractenberg recalls that when he polled his Corporations class, most
responded that they only wanted to learn corporate law to learn how
to undermine capitalism.44
But most dramatic was the creation of the clinics. The faculty
promptly established the Constitutional Litigation Clinic, the Urban
Legal Clinic (where students represented the poor in civil matters),
and the Administrative Process Project, which assisted the New
Jersey Division on Civil Rights in its work, from drafting regulations
to opening the skilled trade union apprenticeship programs to
minority workers.45 Students at People’s Electric now had the
opportunity to engage deeply in the legal struggles of the day. And
the atmosphere was electric indeed when the first class entered a
school transformed by the faculty’s embrace of the Tripartite
Commission report.
The 1970-1971 school year saw several key shifts in the
composition of Rutgers-Newark’s student body. Committed to
doubling the number of African American lawyers in the state within
five years, Rutgers began the year with forty new black students,46
doubtless more than any “‘white”‘ law school had ever seen. It also
saw a substantial increase in female students and a strong group of
anti-war movement activists who came to Newark for the opportunity

43. Arthur Kinoy popularized the phrase. See ARTHUR KINOY, RIGHTS ON TRIAL:
THE ODYSSEY OF A PEOPLE’S LAWYER (1983).
44. TRACTENBERG, supra note 6, at 53–66 (chronicling the story of the Tripartite
Commission and the curricular changes it spurred); see also Blumrosen, supra note 5,
at 814–15.
45. See Askin, supra note 9, at 855; Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 810–14. From
1971–72 I was a student in the APP, assigned to the New Jersey Division of Law’s
Deputy for Civil Rights, David Ben-Asher.
46. TRACTENBERG, supra note 6, at 55–56. By 1971 Black students were 20% of
the student body.
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to work with Arthur Kinoy on the appeal of the Chicago Seven
convictions.47
The Chicago Seven appeal demanded much of these students.
Dozens of students worked reviewing and summarizing trial
transcripts, researching, and even drafting a few of the points in the
massive brief. A few blocks away, Morton Stavis was working on the
appeal of the contempt convictions of the trial lawyers in the Chicago
case—Leonard Weinglass, whose office was across the street from
Ackerson Hall, and William Kunstler, co-founder with Kinoy and
Stavis of the Law Center for Constitutional Rights.48

47. The trial record can be found at Famous American Trials: “The Chicago
FAMOUS
TRIALS,
Trial
1969–1970,
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/Chicago7/chicago7.html (last visited Mar.
16, 2013). A TV review twenty years later that captures much of the feel of the times
can be found at Chicago Tonight: The Chicago Conspiracy Trial (WTTW television
broadcast
Feb.
21,
2005),
available
at
http://www.richsamuels.com/
nbcmm/chicago_conspiracy_trial/index.html.
The report of Daniel Walker to the National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention of Violence concluded:
Police violence was a fact of convention week. Were the policemen who
committed it a minority? It appears certain that they were—but one which
has imposed some of the consequences of its actions on the majority, and
certainly on their commanders. There has been no public condemnation of
these violators of sound police procedures and common decency by either
their commanding officers or city officials. Nor (at the time this report is
being completed—almost three months after the convention) has any
disciplinary action been taken against most of them. That some policemen
lost control of themselves under exceedingly provocative circumstances can
be understood; but not condoned. If no action is taken against them, the
effect can only be to discourage the majority of policemen who acted
responsibly, and further weaken the bond between police and community.
Although the crowds were finally dispelled on the nights of violence in
Chicago, the problems they represent have not been. Surely this is not the
last time that a violent dissenting group will clash head-on with those whose
duty it is to enforce the law. And the next time the whole world will still be
watching.
Daniel Walker, An Excerpt from Rights in Conflict, CHICAGO ’68,
http://chicago68.com/ricsumm.html (reproducing the preface to the report) (last
visited Mar. 12, 2013).
48. That fall, the Center for Constitutional Rights (renamed to omit the word
Law at the insistence of the local New Jersey ethics committee) relocated above a
paint store on Ninth Avenue in New York. Counsel on appeal were mainly from the
Center. Kinoy was the principal drafter of the merits brief, and Stavis the contempt
brief. All the convictions were reversed. In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972).
At a second trial, District Judge Edward T. Gignoux found David Dellinger, Abbott
Hoffman, Jerry Rubin and William Kunstler guilty of various contempts but did not
impose any sanctions. In re Dellinger, 370 F. Supp. 1304 (N.D. Ill. 1973). The
sentences were upheld on appeal. In re Dellinger, 502 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1974).

Seven”
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At the same time, Ruth Bader Ginsburg was teaching an
innovative seminar course on women and the law; the readings began
with Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex.49 The Women’s Rights
Litigation Clinic soon followed, which brought litigator Nadine Taub
to the school. Students soon founded the Women’s Rights Law
Reporter, which was the first specialty law student journal devoted to
the subject.50
Professor Paul Tractenberg joined the faculty in 1970. He soon
began an Education Law seminar and went on to found and lead the
Education Law Center. That Newark-based public interest law firm
has led the forty-year struggle in litigation and legislation to make the
promise of equal education a reality for students in poor districts.51
Dozens of People’s Electric Law School (PELS) students began a
decade of assisting in litigation efforts that transformed American
law, imbuing the students not simply with the skills that their teachers
honed but also with the confidence to believe that they could have an
impact on the law. One can best capture the depth of that confidence
by surveying the litigation accomplishments of that extraordinary
group of law professors.52
URBAN LEGAL CLINIC
The Urban Legal Clinic was formed first. The clinic grew out of
OEO-funded legal services projects that would transform the
constitutional landscape with victories like Goldberg v. Kelly, in
which New York’s MFY Legal Services expanded the concept of due
process to establish the right to notice and a fair hearing before
government welfare benefits were terminated.53
The Urban Legal Clinic’s focus was on economic rights. It was
basically a branch neighborhood Legal Services office, and many

Stavis, Kunstler, and Doris Peterson of the CCR represented the contemnors. Id. at
814.
49. SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans., Bantam
Books 1961) (1949).
50. Strebeigh, supra note 8, at 19; TRACTENBERG, supra note 6, at 60–61; see also
Nadine Taub, The Rutgers-Newark Women’s Rights Litigation Clinic: An Old and a
New Story? 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 1023 (1999).
51. See TRACTENBERG, supra note 6, at 82–84. For the history of the Education
Law Center, which Tractenberg founded, see Mission and History, EDUC. L. CENTER,
http://www.edlawcenter.org/about/mission-history.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2013).
52. See generally Askin, supra note 9.
53. 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970). Mobilization for Youth (MFY) was an OEO
Community Action Program in Manhattan.
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students worked as interns in the summer at the neighborhood legal
offices of the suburban and Newark project offices. There, they
contended with the problems of the urban poor—particularly the
struggles to avoid eviction and to receive the repairs that the
landmark case Marini v. Ireland mandated.54 In a victory for Camden
Regional Legal Services and the New Jersey State Office of Legal
Services, the New Jersey Supreme Court had extended its concept of
“implied warranty of habitability” to every residential leasehold and
introduced us to the equitable distinction between money due and
money owed.55 The New Jersey opinion was published eleven days
after the more widely recognized landmark decision by Circuit Judge
J. Skelly Wright in Javins v. First National Realty Corp came down.56
The two decisions exemplified the rapid development of a new
consumer-protective common law—a trend that could be traced to
the New Jersey Supreme Court’s Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors
decision, which introduced to product liability law the concept of
implied warranty of fitness for use.57
We students represented tenants in rent strikes and eviction
proceedings, arguing for rent reductions for broken toilets and fallen
plaster ceilings, cracked windows, cold radiators, and broken locks on
apartment building doors. Others worked on child support cases,
often for men against whom the County Welfare Board pressed
efforts to recoup welfare funds. Consumer protection was a major
focus, as legal services lawyers handled consumer bankruptcy cases
before pressure from creditors and some sectors of the bar led
Congress to sharply limit the ability of Legal Services attorneys to
handle fee-generating cases.58 Other students worked at the “EssexNewark Joint Law Reform Project.” Such projects made Legal
Services the target of elected officials who resented the reform efforts

54. 265 A.2d 526, 534–35 (N.J. 1970).
55. Id.
56. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see also Richard Chused, Saunders (a.k.a.
Javins) v. First National Realty Corporation, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 191
(2004); Javins Project: Court Papers and Pictures, GEORGETOWN L. LIBR.,
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/library/collections/javins/index.cfm (last visited Mar.
12, 2013). The Chused paper appears in abridged form in PROPERTY STORIES (LAW
STORIES) (Gerald Korngold & Andrew Morriss eds., 2d ed. 2009).
57. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
58. 45 C.F.R. §§ 1609.1–1609.6 (2012).
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and the federal mandate of “maximum feasible participation of the
poor.”59
The attorneys at the Newark Law Reform project ran afoul of
Superior Court judge (and future state Attorney General) Irwin
Kimmelman, who had ordered the leaders of a rent strike in a public
housing project to turn over to the court the rent funds their members
had withheld. The defiant tenant leaders instead returned the money
orders they had collected to the tenants. The tenants’ young Legal
Services lawyers were held in contempt for failure to report the
defiance as soon as they learned of it. The lawyers were represented
by Sheppard and Dickinson Debevoise (now a Senior U.S. District
Judge).
The New Jersey Supreme Court finally vacated the
contempts in 1975.60
Sheppard scored a notable victory in Oxford Consumer Discount v.
Stefanelli.61 In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed a
judgment exonerating homeowners from an obligation to a
Pennsylvania Secondary mortgage lender who had not complied with
New Jersey law.62 Something of the spirit of the times may be gleaned
from the dissent of Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub, which began:

59. History of Civil Legal Aid, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N,
http://www.nlada.org/About/About_HistoryCivil (last visited Mar. 15, 2013). On
Maximum feasible participation, see, e.g., War on Poverty, SARGENT SHRIVER.ORG,
http://www.sargentshriver.org/articles/war-on-poverty (last visited Mar. 15, 2013).
The OEO principle of empowerment—we strove for maximum feasible
participation of the poor—outraged America’s mayors and created
enormous political headaches for Sarge every day. The concept was simple:
poor people had a right to one-third of the seats on every local poverty
program board. The mayors went crazy. I was once asked by a mayor who
had closed five neighborhood centers: ‘Why should I open five
organizations to campaign against me.’ Sarge never buckled. He hated
welfare and believed in community action. Even when Johnson effectively
pulled the plug on the War on Poverty to fund the war in Vietnam, Sarge
fought on and won. We didn't always get our paychecks on time because
Congress delayed our funding—that’s why I got an American Express Card
in 1967—but in the end Sarge won the battle and the anti-poverty program
went on. It’s not always appreciated today, but during the Shriver years
more Americans got out of poverty than during any similar time in our
history.
Id.; see also Lillian B. Rubin, Maximum Feasible Participation: The Origins,
Implications, and Present Status, 389 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 14 (1969).
60. See In re Callan, 331 A.2d 612 (N.J. 1975).
61. 262 A.2d 874 (N.J. 1970).
62. Id.
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This case has an emotional overlay for it involves the distasteful
business of lending money at predatory rates to people who are poor
or soon will be. I would add, irrelevantly to be sure, a regret that
government does not provide loans at tolerable interest charges for
those of our citizens who need them most. Instead, the impecunious
are made a separate class, alone required to underwrite the high
credit risk attributed to some of their number.63

Another aspect of the spirit of the times—and the resistance met
by those who asserted the rights of the poor—is seen in the clinic’s
victory in Smith v. Walker, a proceeding for child support under New
Jersey’s Bastardy Act for “support of an illegitimate child.”64 The
County Court judge reversed the Municipal Court and ordered that
an indigent putative father was entitled to have an HLA bloodgrouping test paid for by the County.65 But the court felt constrained
to observe that:
In the briefs filed in this matter and in the opinion of the municipal
court, much attention was paid to the fact of defendant’s alleged
indigency, but this properly ought not to be an issue before the
court. The Supreme Court caused to be published on August 3,
1970, in the New Jersey Law Journal (93 N.J.L.J. 577), the following
directive: “The attention of the Supreme Court has been called to
the fact that in some instances judges have been questioning Legal
Services attorneys as to their right to represent clients before the
court. The Supreme Court is of the view that it is not the
responsibility of the judge and should not be his concern whether a
person represented by a Legal Service Project attorney is in fact
eligible for such representation. The question of eligibility for
representation by the Legal Services attorney is a matter for
determination by those responsible for the operation of the Legal
Services Offices and not the court.”66

The Urban Legal Clinic remains a part of Rutgers Law School.67
Although the bulk of its work consists of individual case
representation, its faculty has also identified important law reform
issues. The clinic now boasts of a string of landmark victories
reaching to the Circuit and Supreme Courts of the United States.
The clinic often collaborated with the Constitutional Litigation Clinic

63. Id. at 877–78 (Weintraub, C.J., dissenting).
64. 350 A.2d 319 (N.J. Essex County Ct. 1975).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 322.
67. See
Urban
Law
Clinic,
RUTGERS
SCH.
L.
NEWARK,
http://law.newark.rutgers.edu/clinics/urban-legal-clinic (last visited Mar. 15, 2013).
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in such matters, providing students with the opportunity to participate
in high-level appellate litigation under experienced faculty
leadership.68
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS PROJECT
Professor Alfred Blumrosen came to Rutgers in 1955. Labor and
employment law was his principal personal, professional, and
scholarly interest. With his wife and frequent collaborator Ruth, he
was a participant in key civil rights victories in New Jersey courts69
and was an architect of the strengthening of the New Jersey Division
on Civil Rights and the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. Blumrosen had personal experience with affirmative
action before the term was even coined.70
Blumrosen, then an assistant professor at Michigan, was
interviewed at AALS by Willard Heckel, then Associate Dean,
Malcolm Talbott, then assistant dean, and Professor Tom Cowan.
Blumrosen was already an advocate for clinical education, which had
fallen into disfavor as law schools tried to be more selective and
academic.71 Dean Tunks hired both Blumrosen and Clyde Ferguson,
the only Jewish and African American professors at the school,
respectively. Ferguson went on to become General Counsel of the
U.S. Civil Rights Commission and the second African American
professor at Harvard.72 Blumrosen has spent the rest of his
outstanding career at Rutgers where he is now Professor Emeritus.
The fifties were not the sixties. The student body’s average age
then, reports Blumrosen, was about thirty and it was difficult for the
then twenty-six year old novice teacher to “get a class to engage in
discussion that touched on political values.”73 Blumrosen’s principal

68. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (establishing that random
highway police stops of motorists for license and registration checks are
unconstitutional);
Docket
Highlights,
RUTGERS
SCH.
L.
NEWARK,
http://law.newark.rutgers.edu/clinics/docket-highlights (last visited Mar. 15, 2013).
69. Ruth Blumrosen was on the team that won Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Div. Against
Discrimination, 158 A.2d 177 (N.J. 1960), against the builder of the iconic and allwhite south Jersey suburb Levittown (now known as Willingboro) and David v.
Vesta Co., 212 A.2d 345 (N.J. 1965), which upheld the state laws prohibiting racial
discrimination in housing.
70. See Blumrosen, supra note 5, passim.
71. See TRACTENBERG, supra note 6, at 58–66.
72. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Clarence Clyde Ferguson and Individual Rights, 27
HOWARD L.J. 1093 (1984).
73. See Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 782.
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interest was in labor law, particularly in individual worker rights. In
the 1960s, that interest led to work in Trenton beefing up the State
Division on Civil Rights. After Congress passed Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,74 Blumrosen went to Washington to work for the
newly founded Equal Employment Opportunity Commission—a
toothless but symbolically important expression of the new national
commitment to end racial discrimination. Blumrosen served as
Director of Federal State Relations and later as Chief of
Conciliations.75
When construction of a new law school building began in 1963, the
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) picketed, demanding that half
the construction workers be black to mirror the population of the
city.76 The school was part of a new campus being built by the state
university. An early exemplar of the activist spirit, Blumrosen, with
then-Dean Willard Heckel’s blessing, prevailed upon Rutgers
president Mason Gross to file a complaint on the University’s behalf
supporting the picketers’ demands before the state’s Division on Civil
Rights.77
Though himself a prolific writer and contributor to law reviews,78
Blumrosen skeptically remarked that law professors “tend to wait
until case law has developed” before assessing a statute.79 In contrast,
he took the activist view. As he explains, “I was in a position to both
study and help implement parts of Title VII.”80 Blumrosen was,
therefore, a key supporter of the Tripartite Commission’s demand for
relevant and practical clinical education. With Professors Frank
Askin and Richard Chused, the Administrative Process Project was
founded.81 The Project developed two books on civil rights practice82
and drafted new procedures at the Division on Civil Rights, including
a landlord reporting rule that the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld
74. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e.
75. See generally Blumrosen, supra note 72.
76. Id. at 805. CORE is the acronym of the Congress of Racial Equality, a civil
rights group. Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. RES.
& EDUC. INST., http://mlk-kpp01.stanford.edu/index.php/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/
enc_congress_of_racial_equality_core/.
77. Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 806.
78. See Blumrosen’s faculty profile. Alfred W. Blumrosen, RUTGERS SCH. L.
NEWARK, http://law.newark.rutgers.edu/faculty/faculty-profiles/alfred-w-blumrosen
(last visited Mar. 15, 2013).
79. Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 809.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 811–12; see also Askin, supra note 8.
82. See Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 812.
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in New Jersey Builders v. Blair.83 Students in the ten-credit, twosemester clinic interned at the Division on Civil Rights, participating
in intake interviews, assisting in the drafting of probable cause
findings, and drafting proposed regulations designed to integrate the
construction trade unions.84
WOMEN’S RIGHTS L ITIGATION CLINIC
When Willard Heckel hired Ruth Bader Ginsburg in 1963,
Ginsburg was one of the first twenty women to teach at an American
law school. At Rutgers, she was one of two female faculty members
(something NYU lacked). The first was Eva Hanks, now professor
emeritus at Cardozo Law School.
Ginsburg’s field was civil
procedure, particularly comparative civil procedure. But when the
phrase “women’s liberation” joined the argot of the day in 1969,
women beseeched her to teach a course on women and the law.85
In the spring of 1970, Ginsburg taught the second course on women
and the law in the country.86 The seminar had no textbook, because no
such textbook existed. My former law partner Eileen Tulipan recalls
that they began by reading Simone de Beauvoir’s 1949 classic The
Second Sex, a foundational feminist text.87 Ruth (as everyone called
her) led her students on a survey of statutes and pending cases on
women’s rights around the country.88 She drew on the first serious
book—Leo Kanowitz’s Women and the Law: The Unfinished

83. 288 A.2d 855 (N.J. 1972).
84. I was a participant in the project under the supervision of instructor James
Cooper and Deputy A.G. Ben-Asher.
85. See STREBEIGH, supra note 8, at 13–20.
86. STREBEIGH, supra note 8, at 19–20.
87. The book was not universally greeted. The Vatican placed it on the Index of
Forbidden Books. Albert Camus complained that Beauvoir made Frenchmen look
ridiculous. See Francine DuPlessix Gray, Dispatches from the Other, N.Y. TIMES,
May 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/books/review/Gray-t.html.
88. STREBEIGH, supra note 8, at 20. Ginsburg discussed the courses in 1970 in
remarks at the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS).
See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Treatment of Women by the Law: Awakening
Consciousness in the Law Schools, 5 VAL. U. L. REV. 480 (1971). She said of hers
and other developing law school offerings: “These courses develop two themes: the
part law has played in assisting society to ‘protect’ women (and keep them in their
place) and the stimulus law might provide in the evolution of society toward equality
and independence for the still submissive sex.” Id. at 480. The AALS remarks are
reprinted in Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Progression of Women in the Law, 28 VAL.
U. L. REV. 1161 (1994).
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Revolution.89 Women’s rights had begun to emerge after the passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which incorporated the rights of
women to equal treatment.
One case that caught Ginsburg’s eye was that of Sally Reed. Reed
had been barred from administering the estate of her son who died
intestate because an Idaho law directed that when two persons of an
equal degree of consanguinity sought to be administrator, the right
went to the male.90 Another important case for Ginsburg was that of
Nora Simon, a nurse. Stephen Nagler, the director of the New Jersey
ACLU, called Ruth to speak to her about Simon, who had written to
Nagler. Simon and her husband were soldiers. Simon was discharged
when she discovered that she was pregnant. Simon and her husband
gave the infant up for adoption and the couple divorced. Simon’s
husband re-enlisted, but Nora Simon was ineligible for re-enlistment.
Ginsburg, who had never argued in a court before, agreed to take on
Simon’s case, but she didn’t have to meet that challenge just yet.
Writing on her Rutgers stationery, she explained to the Secretary of
the Army that, having given up her child for adoption, Simon was “in
all respects . . . a single woman without issue,” and denial of her reenlistment was inconsistent with the federal policy expressed in Title
VII the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Secretary folded, and Simon
was allowed to return to duty. One woman, one case, no precedent.
The search for cases continued.91
Ginsburg’s husband, Martin, a Manhattan tax lawyer, identified a
new issue to pursue: the IRS denied Charles Moritz a $600 tax
deduction for household help for his eighty-nine year old invalid
mother. Only women were entitled to such a deduction. Melvin Wulf
of the ACLU agreed to fund Ginsburg’s challenge. Soon, the U.S.
Supreme Court accepted Reed’s petition for certiorari, which Wulf
had drafted. Ginsburg sent her Moritz brief to Wulf and NYU law
professor Norman Dorsen, General Counsel of the ACLU. Dorsen
was impressed. He and Wulf brought Ginsburg aboard.92
In the spring of 1971, Wulf and Ginsburg drafted the brief, aided
by four women: Diana Rigelman of Rutgers, Ann Friedman of Yale,
Mary Kelly, and Janice Goodman of NYU. The objective was to

89. See Bob Egelko, Leo Kanowitz, Early Proponent of Women’s Rights, Dies at
81, SFGATE, Aug. 24, 2007, http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Leo-Kanowitzearly-proponent-of-women-s-rights-2508390.php.
90. STREIBEIGH, supra note 8, at 31–32.
91. Id. at 20–23.
92. Id. at 23–27.
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persuade the Supreme Court that the proper degree of review was
strict scrutiny—the same skeptical stance the Court had developed to
knock down Jim Crow racial classifications.93
Ginsburg asked to argue the case, but Sally Reed’s Idaho lawyer,
though grateful for the ACLU’s help, was not about to yield the chair
for his opportunity of a lifetime. The case was argued in October
1971. In her civil procedure class—in which I was a student—
Ginsburg laid out her strategy: it was to track the path, the step by
step process that the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund
took in its path to the landmark Brown v. Board of Education.94
Strict scrutiny should apply to gender classifications. She attended
and helped prepare the oral argument that semester and did not
believe the Court would take that step as its first.95
Indeed, in November—only four weeks after oral argument and
before the semester ended—the Court ruled. The Court neither
embraced nor discussed strict scrutiny, but it did hold that “regardless
of their sex, persons within any one of the enumerated classes of that
section are similarly situated with respect to that objective. By
providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are thus
similarly situated [in relation to the deceased], the challenged section
[of the Idaho statute] violates the Equal Protection Clause.”96
The first blow had been struck. The Court slowly would begin to
examine the use of gender classifications. When she reached the
Supreme Court, Ginsburg, writing for the majority in United States v.
Virginia, struck the state military college’s male-only policy that
denied women the benefits of Virginia Military Institute’s
‘“adversative” educational methods. Regardless, the majority still
had not embraced strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard.97
Ginsburg departed from Rutgers for Columbia in 1972,98 but the
spirit lived on and her commitments were institutionalized. Women
were entering law school in large numbers, imbued with the

93. Id. at 34–35
94. 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
95. Id. at 37–41, 43–44.
96. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971); see STREBEIGH, supra note 8, at 44–45.
97. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). Justice Antonin Scalia, a
graduate of an all-male military academy, unleashed a bitter dissent. See id. at 566
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Michael Frost, Justice Scalia’s Rhetoric of Dissent: A GrecoRoman Analysis of Scalia’s Advocacy in the VMI Case, 91 KY. L.J. 167, 171, 180–81
(2002).
98. STREBEIGH, supra note 8, at 46–47.
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enthusiasm of the “women’s movement.”99 Elizabeth Langer, a 2L,
took the initiative and the first student-edited journal of women’s
rights was born: The Women’s Rights Law Reporter.100
The Women’s Rights Litigation Clinic began on an experimental
basis in the fall of 1972 under the direction of the recent NYU
graduate Janice Goodman. In 1973, the clinic became permanent.
Rutgers hired Nadine Taub, who directed a local ACLU law reform
unit, the Community Legal Action Workshop (CLAW). For three
decades under Taub’s leadership, the Women’s Rights Clinic played a
dramatic role in the development of the law in New Jersey.101 I was
not Taub’s clinic student, but nearly fifteen years ago I experienced
her exacting standards when I partnered with her on a Brandeis brief
for the New Jersey chapter of the National Organization for Women
(NOW) to show that the psychological impact of rape was usually its
gravest consequence.102 In Collins v. Union County Jail, the New
Jersey Supreme Court set aside case law that had long barred
recovery for sexual assault without physical harm or manifestation.103
But that is getting ahead of the story.
The clinic pursued a broad agenda. Reproductive rights, of course,
played a large role. One of the its first efforts in advocating for
reproductive freedom was a pre-Roe v. Wade challenge to a New
Jersey statute criminalizing abortion in Young Women’s Christian
Association v. Kugler.104 In an action by doctors and women, the
court found the statute unconstitutionally vague but dismissed the
women’s claims on federal standing grounds.105 In Doe v. Bridgeton
Hospital, a private hospital was required to let willing doctors
perform abortions at the hospital.106 The most dramatic win was

99. STREBEIGH, supra note 8, at 15–20. There was a good deal of culture shock as
women entered the law school in large numbers. In the spring of 1970 a group of
Rutgers Law women imposed an embargo on the distribution of the yearbook called
the Legacy. Incensed by the page headlined “Women of Rutgers” depicting a “go go
dancer” at a tavern across the street, women took a “guerilla action”. In a leaflet
signed by the “Leg Out of Legacy Conspiracy” the women analyzed the cause: the
editors had a “mens rea, not a woman’s consciousness.”
100. Langer, supra note 39, at 599–601 (2009).
101. See Nadine Taub, The Rutgers-Newark Women’s Rights Litigation Clinic: An
Old and A New Story?, 51 RUTGERS. L. REV. 1023, 1023–24 (1999).
102. On file with author.
103. 696 A.2d 625, 632 (N.J. 1997).
104. 342 F. Supp. 1048 (D.N.J. 1972), aff’d, 475 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1972)
105. Id. at 1052.
106. 366 A.2d 641, 647 (N.J. 1976).
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Right to Choose v. Byrne.107

The New Jersey Supreme Court
required the state Medicaid program to pay for elective abortions.108
That principle was defeated by the Hyde Amendment, which seems
to have become a permanent part of our law, having been
incorporated into the Affordable Care Act.109
Public accommodations for women were a key element of civil
rights litigation from the beginning. In National Organization of
Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., the clinic helped open up
sports for young girls.110 Perhaps the clinic’s most widely publicized
win was in 1990 in Frank v. Ivy Club where the New Jersey Supreme
Court ended discrimination by some Princeton University eating
clubs, relying on the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.111
Taub and the clinic students prevailed in the early sexual
harassment case of Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co.112
However, the Second Circuit dismissed a class action in Alexander v.
Yale University.113 But the case established that a private right of
action could properly be recognized under Title IX of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, which barred gender discrimination by recipients of
federal education aid.114 The clinic initiated the challenge to a genderbased Social Security Act provision regarding widows and widowers
benefits in Califano v. Goldfarb.115 With Taub and ACLU attorney
Melvin Wulf on the brief, Ruth Ginsburg argued the case before the
high court and established the intermediate level of scrutiny with
respect to gender distinctions in the law.116

107. 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982).
108. Id.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 18001; id. § 18023 (containing the special rules regarding abortion
coverage).
110. 318 A.2d 33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974), aff’d, 338 A.2d 198 (N.J. 1974);
see Taub, supra note 101, at 1029.
111. 576 A.2d 241 (N.J. 1990); see Taub, supra note 101, at 1028.
112. 568 F.2d 1044, 1048–49 (3d Cir. 1977) (“Title VII is violated when a supervisor
. . . makes sexual advances or demands toward a subordinate employee and
conditions that employee’s job status . . . on a favorable response to those advances
or demands, and the employer does not take prompt and appropriate remedial action
after acquiring such knowledge.”); see Taub, supra note 101, at 1025.
113. 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980).
114. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance . . . .”).
115. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
116. Id.
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Goldfarb challenged a Social Security Act provision that survivors’
benefits based on the earnings of a deceased husband covered by the
Act were payable to his widow. Such benefits on the basis of the
earnings of a deceased wife covered by the Act were payable to the
widower, however, only if he “was receiving at least one-half of his
support” from his deceased wife.117 In an opinion by Justice Brennan,
the majority held that the gender-based distinction violates the Due
Justice Stevens,
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.118
concurring, concluded that the relevant discrimination “is against
surviving male spouses, rather than against deceased female wage
earners,” and that such discrimination “is merely the accidental
byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about females,” and that
“something more than accident is necessary to justify [under the Fifth
Amendment] the disparate treatment of persons who have as strong a
claim to equal treatment as do similarly situated surviving spouses.”119
The clinic did not neglect family law issues. In 1975 it
established that a woman has a right to change her name after
divorce.120 In Milner v. Milner, the clinic helped expand the right of a
woman to permanent alimony when, despite rehabilitative alimony,
she was unable to find work.121 When the AIDS epidemic struck, the
clinic developed educational materials so that women could obtain
Supplemental Security Income benefits. That work ultimately led to
the establishment of the separate Women and AIDS Clinic in 1998.122
EDUCATION LAW
The highest-impact litigation that originated at Rutgers regarded
education law. Professor Paul Tractenberg joined the faculty in
1970.123 After Peace Corps service and several years at big New York
firms, he opted for “more psychic income,” as he put it.124 Dean
Heckel promised that at least half his work would be in public interest
law. Thus began a career in which the Newark native transformed
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 201 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–31 (1970 & Supp. V)).
Id. at 206–07.
Id. at 218, 223 (Stevens, J., concurring).

Egner v. Egner, 337 A.2d 46 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).
Milner v. Milner, 672 A.2d 206 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
Taub, supra note 101, at 1028–29; see, e.g. Douglas Frank, Helping Women
with AIDS, RUTGERS FOCUS, Dec. 4, 1998, http://urwebsrv.rutgers.edu/
focus/article/School%20of%20Law--Newark/516/.
123. Paul L. Tractenberg, Using Law to Advance the Public Interest: Rutgers Law
School and Me, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 1001, 1003 (1999).
124. Id.
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the New Jersey legal and educational landscape. So huge was the
impact of his bold litigation strategies that it was too large for a law
school clinic. Committed to remedying the consequences of racial
discrimination and urban poverty, Tractenberg founded and became
the first director of the Education Law Center. It has carried on forty
years of struggle to put meat on the bones of New Jersey’s
Constitution of 1947 that mandated a system of “thorough and
efficient system of free public schools.”125
As Professor Tractenberg observed in his 1998 review of the effort:
It is almost impossible to pick up a daily newspaper in New Jersey
without seeing prominent coverage of public education issues.
Often, the coverage relates to constitutional litigation in progress or
threatened, and usually the basis of that litigation is a provision of
New Jersey’s Constitution of 1947. The most dramatic example is
the effort begun in 1970, and still proceeding, to use the
constitution’s Education Clause to reform the way in which the state
funds and provides public education to students in its poor urban
districts.126

In the United States, education has always been a primarily local
matter, though federal intervention became a much larger force with
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a principal force in implementing the
Brown v. Board of Education promise to end the South’s dual school
systems.127 The United States Supreme Court in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez made it clear that the
Court would not use the Fourteenth Amendment to address the
problem of unequal provision of school resources by the states.128 In
its conservative jurisprudence, the Court saw in the Fourteenth
Amendment only limits on state action, not a charter for federal
action to accomplish the post-Civil War Amendment’s goals of
eliminating the legacy of slavery and racial discrimination. That
principle has led now to the appalling rejection by the United States
Supreme Court of voluntary racial integration. In Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, Chief Justice
Roberts rejected the fundamental premise of Brown—that
segregation stigmatizes—and that of Bakke—that diversity is a high

125. Id. at 1001–02, 1012–14; Paul L. Tractenberg, The Evolution and
Implementation of Educational Rights Under the New Jersey Constitution of 1947,
29 RUTGERS L.J. 827, 833 (1998).
126. Tractenberg, supra note 125, at 828–29.
127. See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson County, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967)
128. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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educational value—and declared flatly that “the way to stop
discriminating by race is to stop discriminating by race.”129
Tractenberg looked to the state constitution to both implement old
law and to make new law. He engaged in two principal efforts: first,
to create new law to equalize public school funding, and second, to
implement old law to achieve racial balance in the Englewood Cliffs
v. City of Englewood dispute.130 There, the small, wealthy borough of
Englewood Cliffs, which had no high school, sought to withdraw from
its link to largely black Englewood and affiliate instead with the
affluent, white district of Tenafly.131 Challenged by the NAACP, the
Englewood Cliffs battle was a protracted one. But it did not succeed
in the ultimate goal of integration by the creation of a regional school
district in the county.132
Tractenberg’s educational reform effort had begun with a
challenge by Jersey City students and parents to the state’s public
school funding system.133 Its equal protection focus was typical of a
wave of litigation that sought to expand the parameters of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which had long been constrained by narrow
textual constructions, beginning with the notorious Civil Rights
Cases.134 Spurred by success in the 1971 Supreme Court of California
case Serrano v. Priest,135 Tractenberg (with the help of the
Constitutional Litigation Clinic) joined in Robinson v. Cahill,136 the

129. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007)
130. Tractenberg, supra note 123, at 1005–06.
131. Id. at 1014.
132. Bd. of Educ. of Englewood Cliffs v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Tenafly, 788
A.2d 729, 731 (N.J. 2002) (“The State Board [of Education] concluded that neither
regionalization nor agency adjudication could resolve the segregation problem at
Dwight Morrow. Although acknowledging that the protracted litigation involving the
three districts had ‘not ameliorated the racial isolation of the students attending
Englewood’s public schools,’ the State Board expressed its intention to pursue a
voluntary solution that focused on the development at Dwight Morrow of a magnet
school, affiliated with a university, that was designed to attract students from
neighboring districts in order to achieve enhanced racial diversification of Dwight
Morrow.”).
133. TRACTENBERG, supra note 6, at 82–84.
134. See 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (finding that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments are “self-executing without any ancillary legislation,” and that sections
I and II of the Civil Rights Act of 1876 were therefore unconstitutional).
135. 487 P.2d 1241 (1971).
136. Constitutional Litigation Clinic Professors Askin, Bender (through 1975), and
Sheppard participated on six of the occasions on which the New Jersey Supreme
Court considered Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1976), amended by 360 A.2d
400 (N.J. 1976); 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976); 351 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975); 339 A.2d 193
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Jersey City action, as counsel for extremely active amici—the Newark
NAACP chapter and the ACLU. In 1972, the trial judge Theodore
Botter struck the state statute, largely on federal and state equal
protection grounds. He declared, “[L]ocal control is illusory. It is
control for the wealthy, not for the poor.”137
But in its landmark decision, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
took a sharply different approach. Spurning the state and federal
equal protection clauses, the court grounded its affirmance on the
state constitution’s “thorough and efficient clause,” which provides
that “The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support
of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the
instruction of all the children in this State between the ages of five
and eighteen years.”138
As Professor Tractenberg views it, the New Jersey Supreme Court
essentially recognized it as a “specialized equal protection clause.”
Relying on a constitutional affirmative obligation of state government
the ‘narrow’ ruling enabled the court to embark on what has proven
to be a multi-decade effort—without the additional burden of a
unique expansive understanding of the equal protection principle.139
The legislature responded with the Public School Education Act of
1975, which the court found facially constitutional while warning that
it might fail to meet state constitutional standards “as applied”:
We should and do proceed upon the assumption that complete
funding will be forthcoming to furnish the necessary means to put
the statute into full operation. The determination we reach—that
the statute is facially constitutional—rests upon this assumption. Put
more plainly, the 1975 Act, absent funding, could never be
considered a constitutional compliance with the 1875 amendment to
the New Jersey Constitution—adjuring the legislative establishment
of a system of thorough and efficient education.140

(N.J. 1975); 306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1973); 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); and in trial court at
287 A.2d 187 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972).
137. Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187, 212 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972).
138. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1 (1947); Robinson, 287 A.2d at 209.
139. Tractenberg, supra note 101, at 1011.
140. Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129, 132 n.2 (N.J. 1976); see also Robinson v.
Cahill, 358 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1976) (issuing an order enjoining every public officer from
expending any funds for the support of any free public school unless timely legislative
action was taken providing for the funding of the Public School Education Act of
1975 for the 1976-77 school year); 360 A.2d 400 (N.J. 1976) (dissolving the 1976 order
due to passage legislation permitting full funding of the Public School Education Act
of 1975).
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Thus began stage II, which continues to this day: the battle over
funding. The State ran afoul of the court in Abbott v. Burke in 1984.
Argued by 1973 Rutgers graduate Marilyn J. Morheuser,141 with
Professor Tractenberg on the briefs, the boldness of the New Jersey
Supreme Court’s declaration astonishes even today:
We find that under the present system the evidence compels but one
conclusion: the poorer the district and the greater its need, the less
the money available, and the worse the education. That system is
neither thorough nor efficient. We hold the Act unconstitutional as
applied to poorer urban school districts. Education has failed there,
for both the students and the State. We hold that the Act must be
amended to assure funding of education in poorer urban districts at
the level of property-rich districts; that such funding cannot be
allowed to depend on the ability of local school districts to tax; that
such funding must be guaranteed and mandated by the State; and
that the level of funding must also be adequate to provide for the
special educational needs of these poorer urban districts in order to
redress their extreme disadvantages.142

As Professor Tractenberg has explained, the court demanded
“spending parity” between poor urban districts and the average of
what the state’s wealthiest districts spend on “regular education” (i.e.
the core curriculum), plus additional resources to meet urban
students’ special needs. Further, state government was required to
take responsibility for bringing to an acceptable level the physical
plant and facilities of poor district schools. Finally, state oversight
was required to ensure educational effectiveness.143
141. The case was not entrusted to a young phenom. Morheuser was a former
Catholic nun, experienced educator and seasoned community activist who came to
Newark for law school.
142. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 363 (N.J. 1990).
143. Tractenberg, supra note 123, at 1012–13. The court has established for New
Jersey urban students the most comprehensive set of constitutional rights of any
state. They include:
Parity of regular education funding;
Whole school reform;
Full-day kindergarten;
At least half-day preschool for three-and four-year old;s
School-based coordination and referral of students to off-site health and
social services, and, if necessary, school-based services;
Enhanced security;
Enhanced technology;
Alternative schools;
School-to-work and college-transition programs; and
Safe, sanitary, and sufficient facilities.
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An epic battle ensued. The mandate and its asserted failure was at
the center of political contest in New Jersey. In the aftermath of the
2008 financial crisis and the election of a blunt anti-tax governor, the
court in Abbott XXI declared in a 2011 opinion by Associate Justice
and Rutgers law graduate Jaynee Lavecchia: “It is now undisputed
that the State has failed to fully fund SFRA in Fiscal Year (FY) 2011.
The record in this matter shows generally that the cuts to school aid
funding, in districts of various needs, have been instructionally
consequential and significant.” The state was again ordered to
correct these deficiencies.144
There may be no greater lasting legacy of the People’s Electric Law
school than the Homeric efforts of Professor Tractenberg and the
New Jersey Supreme Court to address inadequate public education—
one of the central causes and consequences of urban poverty and our
nation’s heritage of racial discrimination.

MT. LAUREL—OPEN HOUSING
If Robinson v. Cahill has a rival it is Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,145 a decision cited 1,369 times
to date.146 Plaintiffs attacked the system of land use regulation by
defendant Township of Mount Laurel on the ground that the system
unlawfully excluded low- and moderate-income families from the
municipality. The trial court declared the Township’s zoning
ordinance totally invalid.147 Represented by Camden Regional Legal
Services, the plaintiffs sought relief as representatives of a class of
poor black and Latino persons in need of access to affordable
housing. But the Supreme Court initiated a revolution in New Jersey
land use planning by broadening the protected class, declaring:
It is plain beyond dispute that proper provision for adequate
housing of all categories of people is certainly an absolute essential
in promotion of the general welfare required in all local land use
regulation. Further the universal and constant need for such
housing is so important and of such broad public interest that the
general welfare which developing municipalities like Mount Laurel

Id. at 1013.
144. Abbott v. Burke, 206 N.J. 332, 341 (2011).
145. 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
146. Citing References, WESTLAW, http://www.westlaw.com (find citation “336
A.2d 713”; then follow “Citing References” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 15, 2013).
147. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 290 A.2d 465, 473 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972).
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must consider extends beyond their boundaries and cannot be
parochially confined to the claimed good of the particular
municipality.
It has to follow that, broadly speaking, the
presumptive obligation arises for each such municipality
affirmatively to plan and provide, by its land use regulations, the
reasonable opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of
housing, including, of course, low and moderate cost housing, to
meet the needs, desires and resources of all categories of people who
may desire to live within its boundaries. Negatively, it may not
adopt regulations or policies which thwart or preclude that
opportunity.148

Thus began a struggle that continues to this day. In March 2012,
the Appellate Division reviewed an Executive Order of Governor
Chris Christie, who sought to abolish the legislatively created
remedial Council on Affordable Housing (COAH). The New Jersey
high court explained that COAH was “the entity charged with
implementing and administering the legislative mandates of the [Fair
Housing Act].”149 At issue on appeal was whether a governor,
pursuant to the Executive Reorganization Act of 1969, could “abolish
an independent agency created by the Legislature that is ‘in but not
of’ a department of the Executive Branch.”150 As applied to the case,
the narrower issue was whether Governor Christie could abolish
COAH and transfer its duties, responsibilities, and obligations to the
sole authority of an Executive Branch department.151 The court
rejected the Governor’s Executive Order as exceeding his power.152
From 1976 to his untimely death in 2009, Professor John Payne was
a key intellectual force as well as one of the leading lawyers in the Mt.
Laurel cases. He appeared on behalf of housing advocates as a
volunteer attorney for public interest groups and as a faculty member
on behalf of the Constitutional Litigation Clinic and the

148. Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d at 727–28.
149. In re Plan for Abolition of Council on Affordable Hous. & Providing for the
Transfer of the Functions, Powers, & Duties of the Council on Affordable Hous. To
the Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, Reorganization Plan 1-2011, 38 A.3d 620, 621 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2012); see N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301–52:27D-329 (West 2013).
150. In re Plan for Abolition of Council on Affordable Hous. & Providing for the
Transfer of the Functions, Powers, & Duties of the Council on Affordable Hous. To
the Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, Reorganization Plan 1-2011, 38 A.3d 620, 621 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2012).
151. Id.
152. Id.
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Environmental Law Clinic.153 His nationally recognized Mt. Laurel
work led to a re-conceptualization of the housing law field and a shift
in thinking from a world in which there was no right to housing
opportunity to one in which decent shelter is considered a
fundamental right. He also authored a leading casebook on land
use.154
CONSPIRACY ON TRIAL—THE CHICAGO EIGHT
The cadre that embraced the slogan “People’s Electric” was further
electrified by the federal Anti-Riot Act155 prosecution of leaders and
celebrities of anti-war and counter-culture known as the trial of the
Chicago Eight. The group became the Chicago Seven after Black
Panther Party leader Bobby Seale was bound and gagged in the court
room for two days, then severed as the remaining defendants
continued in the frequently raucous trial that ended in the convictions
of five156 and contempt convictions for the defendants and their
lawyers, William Kunstler and Leonard Weinglass. The conspiracy
and the contempt convictions were overturned by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, which found, “It is not a simple matter to evaluate
this trial, nor to assign responsibility for its deficiencies. It lasted
almost five months, and the transcript exceeds 22,000 pages. Trial
decorum often fell victim to dramatic and emotionally inflammatory
episodes.”157

153. See John Payne, Noted Affordable Housing and Land Use Scholar and
Beloved Teacher at Rutgers Law School-Newark, Dies, RUTGERS MEDIA RELATIONS
(June 16, 2009), http://news.rutgers.edu/medrel/news-releases/2009/06/john-paynenoted-aff-20090616/.
154. PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT (John M. Payne et Al.
eds., 7th ed. 2008).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (2006); see Nat’l Mobilization Comm. v. Foran, 411 F.2d 934,
939 (7th Cir. 1969) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2101 as constitutional). In the Chicago
Seven appeal, Judge Pell dissented in part, saying he found the act overbroad and
facially unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment right to freedom of
speech. See United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 409–16 (7th Cir. 1972) (Pell,
C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
156. David Dellinger, Rennie Davis, Tom Hayden, Abbie Hoffman, and Jerry
Rubin were convicted. John Froines and Lee Weiner were acquitted. Seale was
never re-tried. See Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 340.
157. Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 385 (majority opinion) (reversing all convictions and
remanding for new trial “if the government elects so to proceed”); see also In re
Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 395 (7th Cir. 1972) (setting aside summary contempt
convictions because “[i]n this situation, the possible prejudice to the accused as well
as the diminution of the quality of justice in the public eye overrides any economy of
effort that would be achieved by summary procedure”).
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As Judge Pell echoed in his partial dissent, the record on appeal
included “22,000 numbered transcript pages and some 2485 pages of
parties’ briefs, using that term in no descriptive sense.”158 Those
transcript volumes—long before PCs and PDFs, when even flat glass
platen photocopiers were unknown—were fodder for an army of law
students. We summarized transcripts and prepared memoranda
supporting dozens of trial objections made in the raucous proceedings
before the overwhelmed trial judge, whose incompetence provided
much fuel for the antics of the Yippie leaders Abbie Hoffman and
Jerry Rubin.
At the heart of the passion was the fact that the charge—
conspiracy to incite a riot—was aimed at leaders of a broad coalition
of opponents of the war in Vietnam who had found themselves the
victims of what an official commission of inquiry termed a “police
riot” during the Democratic presidential nominating convention of
August 1968.159 It is important to remember that Robert F. Kennedy
had been murdered only a few weeks before the convention at a
moment when he had attained commanding momentum in his
Presidential campaign, in which he pledged to end the war in Vietnam
that his brother had started.160 Two days before he was murdered,
Kennedy had attended mass at the Cristo Rey chapel in Oxnard,
California, praying with Cesar Chavez,161 the charismatic leader of the
United Farm Workers Union whose pacifism and struggles on behalf
of migrant workers made him a Gandhian figure for American
liberals. It is a testament to his work that President Obama has now
declared Chavez’s home to be a national monument.162 The anti-war
activists who gathered in Chicago were appalled that the Democratic
Party was about to nominate Hubert H. Humphrey, the Vice
President who could not bring himself to break with President

158. Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 409 (Pell, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part).
159. See JEROME H. SKOLNICK, THE POLITICS OF PROTEST (1969) (report to the
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence).
160. See Robert F. Kennedy, ROBERT F. KENNEDY CENTER FOR JUST. & HUM.
RTS., http://rfkcenter.org/robert-f-kennedy (last visited Mar. 16, 2013).
161. Shane Cohn, In Memory of Cesar Chavez, VC REPORTER (Mar. 29, 2012),
http://www.vcreporter.com/cms/story/detail/in_memory_of_cesar_chavez/9680/.
162. Barack Obama, Presidential Proclamation—Establishment of the Cesar E.
Chavez National Monument, WHITE HOUSE PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (Oct. 8,
2012),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/10/08/presidentialproclamation-establishment-cesar-e-chavez-national-monument.
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Johnson, who had committed 500,000 soldiers to a war which we
plainly seemed to be losing and were conducting in a shameful way.
Newark was the post-trial ground zero for the work on appeal.
Professor Arthur Kinoy was the principal drafter of the brief on
appeal, and he had thousands of pages of transcripts that needed to
be summarized for a statement of facts. Dozens of law students
answered the call. A few of us were assigned to draft some of the
points on appeal. A couple of blocks away at 744 Broad Street,
Morton Stavis, co-founder of the CCR and Kinoy’s frequent
collaborator, continued to labor on the appeal of the contempt
citations. Across the street from the law school was the Bleecker
Street office of Leonard Weinglass, who had just formed a firm with
four young lawyers. The firm was named in egalitarian and
alphabetical fashion: Ball, Broege, Elberg, Fogel & Weinglass. The
“band of brothers and sisters” élan of that effort was an important
part of the school’s spirit.
Thus, many students began their careers under the direct
mentorship of one of the great lawyers of the civil rights and anti-war
movement, Arthur Kinoy. Others had opportunities to work with
William Kunstler and Leonard Weinglass. A few (I was one of the
lucky) also got to see the work of Morton Stavis, who was the finest
legal craftsman of the three founders of the CCR.163 We began our
law school careers engaged in one of the great legal battles of the
time, directly under the leadership of lawyers of the first class. Many
of us went on to the leadership of the National Lawyers Guild,
American Civil Liberties Union, the Center for Constitutional Rights,
and the New Jersey Office of the Public Defender.
CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION CLINIC
Kinoy, Sheppard, and Askin formed the Constitutional Litigation
Clinic. Askin was its director, and he still is.164 He brought on two
outstanding lawyers to assist—William J. Bender, and his wife Rita
Schwerner, the widow of the murdered civil rights worker Michael

163. A Lexis search shows that Morton Stavis was counsel in 161 cases with
published opinions, many of them in the United States Supreme Court. When, many
years later, I was involved in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, I was proud
to have Morton Stavis move my admission to the bar of the high court.
164. See Askin, supra note 9.
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Schwerner.165 Askin was an activist of the ACLU whose New Jersey
office was a couple of blocks away. The clinic’s agenda was bold.
Askin filed a class action against Arthur Sills, the Attorney
General of New Jersey, and a raft of local police departments for
their ‘red squad’ surveillance of anti-war activists. The claim was that
an overbroad surveillance initiative would have a “chilling effect” on
exercise of free speech. Some examples of such speech include: civil
disturbance, riot, rally, protest, demonstration, march, and
confrontation. The Attorney General had asked all 567 New Jersey
municipal police departments to complete Security Incident Reports
which called for “the names of the organizations or groups involved
in the ‘incident.’”
The Attorney General’s instructions singled out “Examples of
types: Left wing, Right wing, Civil Rights, Militant, Nationalistic,
Pacifist, Religious, Black Power, Ku Klux Klan, Extremist, etc.” and
as “Examples of How Involved: Sponsor, co-sponsor, supporter,
assembled group, etc.” Individuals were also to be the subjects of
reports.
The “Narrative” portion of the form read:
“citizenship/naturalization data—parental background/occupation—
armed forces service/draft status—membership, affiliation and/or
status with organizations or groups—education background—habits
or traits—places frequented—parole/probation data—data on
immediate family—financial/credit status—include other record of
past activities, findings and/or observations.”166
The state Supreme Court in Anderson v. Sills brushed off the
named plaintiffs’ fears as “hypothetical,” reversed the summary
judgment grant in favor of plaintiffs, and remanded but did not
dismiss the clinic’s case.167 The clinic’s students were involved in
every phase of the case. I drafted questions for and attended my first
deposition—that of an Assistant Attorney General who had helped to
implement the surveillance scheme.

165. The murder of Mississippi Summer Project volunteers Michael Schwerner,
Andrew Goodman, and James Chaney was a galvanizing event. The murders were
the subject of the movie Mississippi Burning. The frustrating efforts to obtain justice
for the slain workers is chronicled by Douglas Linder in his Famous Trials series.
Douglas O. Linder, The Missippi Burning Trial (U.S. v. Price et al.), FAMOUS TRIALS,
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/price&bowers/Account.html
(last
updated Aug. 2009).
166. Anderson v. Sills, 265 A.2d 678, 683 (N.J. 1970).
167. Id.; see also Anderson v. Sills, 363 A.2d 381, 384 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1976) (dismissed as moot because defendants had removed the offensive forms and
guidelines and were, therefore, no longer ripe for adjudication).
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Anderson v. Sills inspired a much broader effort by Askin. It had
been revealed that the Department of Defense had been conducting
surveillance of civilian anti-war activity. The Clinic filed suit against
Melvin Laird, the Secretary of Defense. Virtually every anti-war, civil
rights, and civil liberties group in the country joined Tatum v. Laird as
plaintiffs. Arlo Tatum was the leader of the Quaker unit Central
Committee for Conscientious Objectors. We did legal research and
helped organize a group of social scientists whose opinions were
offered to prove a fact—that such garrison state tactics of surveillance
by the military would have a “chilling effect” on free speech.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that plaintiffs
had stated a claim on which relief could be granted.168 The ACLU
supported the clinic’s appeal with the great Melvin L. Wulf on the
brief. As a student, I helped organize the sessions that yielded a
“Brandeis brief” appendix to plaintiffs’ brief—a statement by social
scientists regarding the “chilling effect” on free speech created by the
existence of wide military surveillance of civilian activity.
Extraordinary amici joined: Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. of South
Carolina argued the cause for the Unitarian Universalist Association
et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.169 Former Assistant Attorney
General for Civil Rights Burke Marshall and Harvard Professor
Arthur R. Miller filed a brief for a “Group of Former Army
Intelligence Agents” as amici curiae urging affirmance.170 But in
Laird v. Tatum, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Warren Burger, held that plaintiffs, whose own speech had not been
chilled, had not suffered an injury that satisfied the case and
controversy requirement of Article III.171 I will just say that it struck
us as ironic that daring to challenge the military disqualified one from
challenging the military.
Other clinic cases of the period included William Bender’s
successful challenge to the constitutionality of 40 U.S.C. § 193(g), the
statute upon which the Chief of the Capitol Police relied to bar a
group of women—the Jeannette Rankin Brigade—who sought to

168. Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
169. Brief of Unitarian Universalist Ass’n Council for Christian Social Action et al.
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (No. 71288), 1972 WL 135681.
170. Brief of a Group of Former Army Intelligence Agents as Amici Curiae, Laird
v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (No. 71-288), 1972 WL 135683.
171. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
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parade in front of the United States Capitol and then enter to entreat
members of Congress to bring an end to the war in Vietnam. Their
challenge was joined by notable intervenors—Members of Congress,
New York’s Bella Abzug and Berkeley’s Ronald Dellums, one of the
founders of the Congressional Black Caucus.172 The case was decided
by three District Court judges empanelled under the now-repealed 28
U.S.C. § 2282,173 who found that the Capitol Grounds statute’s
limitations on demonstrations was unconstitutional.174
As observed, Rutgers was deeply involved with the responses to
the urban crisis and the civil disorders—the riots—of the 1960s. One
of the most disturbing manifestations of that period was the killing by
a mob of an on-duty policeman, John V. Gleason, who had
confronted and shot a young man in Plainfield, New Jersey. Eleven
people were tried and two convicted in a trial in which the police had
little evidence to identify the perpetrators. The public controversy
was bitter. Many rallied to support the police, while a citizens’ group
rallied to the side of the defendants who, they believed, had been
picked out practically at random. One of the two convicted,175 George
Merritt, was almost undoubtedly innocent. A civilian employee at the
Army Nike Missile Base in Monmouth County, Merritt was tried and
convicted three times before being released in 1980 on a habeas
corpus petition granted by federal judge Curtis Meanor. Represented
then by Morton Stavis, the court found Merritt had suffered grave

172. Founded in 1971, its original members were Representatives Shirley
Chisholm, William L. Clay, George W. Collins, John Conyers, Ronald Dellums,
Charles Diggs, Augustus F. Hawkins, Ralph Metcalfe, Parren Mitchell, Robert Nix,
Charles B. Rangel, Louis Stokes, and Washington, D.C. delegate Walter Fauntroy.
See Our History, AM.’S CONG. BLACK CAUCUS, http://thecongressional
blackcaucus.com/about/our-history/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2013).
173. Section 2282 provided for a three judge District Court when a statute’s
constitutionality was challenged. One of the three was to be a Circuit Judge. Appeal
was directly to the Supreme Court of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2282
(repealed 1976).
174. Jeannette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of Capitol Police, 342 F. Supp. 575 (D.D.C.
1972).
175. The conviction of co-defendant Gail Madden, like Merritt’s was reversed on
the ground that the aiding and abetting instruction was prejudicial. Like Merritt she
was convicted in a second trial. But Merritt’s verdict was reversed, setting the stage
for a third trial – which also resulted in conviction. This history is recited in United
States ex rel. Merritt v. Hicks, 492 F. Supp. 99 (D.N.J. 1980) (with Rutgers grad Neil
Mullin assisting on the briefs).
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violations of the Brady v. Maryland176 requirement that a prosecutor
must disclose exculpatory evidence.177 Merritt was not tried again.
In June 1971, the Appellate Division reversed Merritt’s conviction
for the first degree murder of police officer Gleason. Before the
second trial began, the United States Supreme Court in June 1972 in
Furman v. Georgia effectively voided every capital statute in the
country.178 The New Jersey Supreme Court, in State v. Funicello, had
five months earlier declared the state’s capital murder statute
unconstitutional because a provision that one could escape a death
sentence by waiving trial by jury improperly burdened the exercise of
that right.179 Merritt was no longer charged with a capital crime, we
argued, and was therefore entitled to bail. Bender assigned me to
draft a motion and memorandum for release on bail under the New
Jersey Constitution, which provides: “No person shall, after acquittal,
be tried for the same offense. All persons shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the
proof is evident or presumption great.”180 I was shocked when the
trial court, Appellate Division, and state Supreme Court refused to
set bail for Merritt. The clinic filed a habeas corpus petition for bail,
which was granted, with the bulk of the briefing done very ably by a
People’s Electric Law School student from the class of 1973 (and later
clinic staff attorney) Larry Gross.181
That same year, Arthur Kinoy won one of his greatest victories,

United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan.182 There had been others. Chief among them were
Powell v. McCormack, in which the United States Supreme court
spurned the defense of non-justiciability and ordered John
McCormack, the Speaker of the House, to reinstate Harlem
Congressman Adam Clayton Powell.183 Another was Dombrowski v.
Pfister.184 James Dombrowski was a leader of a leftist civil rights
group, the Southern Conference Educational Fund, which was closely

176. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
177. United States ex rel. Merritt v. Hicks, 492 F. Supp. 99 (D.N.J. 1980).
178. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
179. 286 A.2d 55 (N.J. 1972).
180. N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 11.
181. United States ex rel. Merritt v. Vukcevich, 339 F. Supp. 779, 781 (D.N.J.
1972).
182. 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (sustaining the warrant requirement in domestic
surveillance cases).
183. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
184. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
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linked to Martin Luther King’s Southern Christian Leadership
Conference.185 He was threatened with indictment for violation of the
blatantly unconstitutional Louisiana Subversive Activities and
Communist Control Law186 and the Communist Propaganda Control
Law.187 Persuaded by Kinoy that the statute was unconstitutionally
overbroad the United States Supreme Court authorized District
Courts to enjoin bad faith prosecutions of civil rights workers, which
could have a “chilling effect” on free speech.188
In United States v. District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Lawrence Robert ‘Pun’ Plamondon, a member of a fringe
leftist group, was charged with the dynamite bombing of a CIA office
in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Kinoy, joined on the brief by Bender and
Kunstler, argued successfully that the United States’ electronic
surveillance of defendant’s conversations without prior judicial
approval was unlawful. As his work was in progress, Kinoy explained
his strategy to us in his popular Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
course. And a group of students from the Constitutional Litigation
clinic assisted in the legal research upon which Kinoy and the others
drew in their successful mandamus action to compel the United States
to disclose the fruit of its electronic surveillance in order to examine it
in a “taint” hearing. The opinion in United States v. United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, written by Justice
Lewis Powell, is a landmark of Fourth Amendment law.189 Among
the many lessons for students was that a conservative corporate
lawyer like Lewis Powell could be persuaded by carefully developed
and well-supported argument.
Justice Powell figured prominently in another issue important to
Rutgers—the defense of its Minority Student Program.
The
Constitutional Litigation clinic represented Rutgers—the State
University of New Jersey—in an amicus brief defending the principle
of affirmative action in one of the first “reverse discrimination” cases.
Marco DeFunis, Jr., a Caucasian man, asserted he had been wrongly
denied law school admission on account of his race. The University
of Washington School of Law set aside minority applicants and

185. See Irwin Klibaner, The Travail of Southern Radicals: The Southern
Conference Educational Fund, 1946–1976, 49 J. S. HIST. 179, 180 (1983).
186. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:358–14:374 (1962).
187. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:390–14:390.8 (1962).
188. Pfister, 380 U.S. at 490.
189. 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (sustaining the warrant requirement in domestic
surveillance cases).
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reviewed them to identify those most likely to succeed in law school.
The school explained: “[w]e gave no preference to, but did not
discriminate against, either Washington residents or women in
making our determinations.
An applicant’s racial or ethnic
background was considered as one factor in our general attempt to
convert formal credentials into realistic predictions.”190 The Supreme
Court dismissed DeFunis v. Odegaard as moot because DeFunis had
been admitted by court order—his score on the school’s weighted
criteria was higher than some minority candidates. Justice Douglas
disagreed on mootness; he felt the issue should be dealt with sooner,
rather than later.191
The chance came again in a few years, and Lewis Powell played a
prominent role. The case was that of Allen Bakke against the
Regents of the University of California—another “reverse
discrimination” case. The plaintiff alleged that as a medical school
applicant he had been turned down, while African American students
with what Bakke asserted to be lesser credentials had been accepted.
Askin and Ruth Ginsburg joined the ACLU amicus brief,192 while
Annamay Sheppard and Jonathan Hyman, the co-director of the
Constitutional Litigation clinic, represented Rutgers University as
friend of the court.193 Lewis Powell’s concurring opinion on a divided
court rejected racial “preferences” but its focus on “diversity” as an
educational value has framed the constitutional debate and has saved
affirmative action in higher education, where it clings precariously to
the precipice.194

190. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 324 n.5 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(citing DeFunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169, 1174 (Wash. 1973) (en banc)).
191. Id. at 324.
192. Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, the ACLU of Northern
California, the ACLU of Southern California, Amici Curiae, Regents of the Univ. of
Cali. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1977) (No. 76-711), 1977 WL 187972.
193. Brief of the Board of Governors of Rutgers, the State University of New
Jersey, the Rutgers Law School Alumni Association and the Student Bar Association
of the Rutgers School of Law-Newark Amici Curiae, Regents of the Univ. of Cali. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1977) (No. 76-711), 1977 WL 189514.
194. Regents of the Univ. of Cali. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313–14 (1978).
Announcing the opinion of the Court Powell wrote “even at the graduate level, our
tradition and experience lend support to the view that the contribution of diversity is
substantial.” Id. at 313. In Sweatt v. Painter, the Court made a similar point with
specific reference to legal education:
The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and practice, cannot
be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the
law interacts. Few students, and no one who has practiced law would
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PELS GRADS IN THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER
But what did they do after graduation? The largest cadre of PELS
graduates entered the statewide Office of the Public Defender (PD),
which handles the defense of the overwhelming majority of indictable
offenses in New Jersey.195 As the largest “law firm” in New Jersey,
PD absorbed, I am sure, more PELS graduates than any other
employer. There they continued the civil rights work that had been
begun at the clinics—fighting in the courts every day for fair trials.
Taking advantage of the PD’s statewide organization, they continued
the fight begun at the Constitutional Litigation Clinic against the
notoriously arbitrary vehicle search practices of the State Police.196
The PD’s systematic gathering of information led to federal
intervention and eventually transformed the notorious racial profiling
highway patrol practices, leading to a ten-year consent decree
monitoring the state police.197
But the PD’s most important and successful effort was against the
death penalty, which during the PELS glory years was not part of
New Jersey law. That changed with its restoration in 1982. For the
next twenty-five years until its 2007 legislative repeal,198 the PD was
involved in or conducted solely the defense of every death penalty

choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of
ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is concerned.
339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
195. I take particular pride in my classmates of ’73 who joined the PD. Matthew
Catania, Lois DeJulio, Patricia Del Bueno, David Evans, David Hamilton, Dale
Jones, Paul Klein, James Louis, Cynthia Matheke, Marilyn Morheuser, Harold
“Bud” Mynett, Marianne Nelson, Howard Sims, Thomas Smith, Jerry Soffer, and
Phyllis Warren. Six of these attorneys remain on staff with the PD as of this writing.
I had the privilege of working as a “pool attorney” for the PD from 1979–83.
196. Lewis v. Hyland, 554 F.2d 93, 94–95 (3d Cir. 1977) (“When this case initially
was before us, we determined that the complaint set forth facts which, if proved,
would justify a federal equitable remedy. Plaintiffs have now substantiated (and,
indeed, augmented) their initial allegations. The district court’s extensive findings of
fact reveal what can only be described as callous indifference by the New Jersey State
Police for the rights of citizens using New Jersey roads. Were it not for the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Rizzo v. Goode, which was announced after the district court
proceedings had been concluded, our original mandate in this case, would have
required that we reverse the district court’s denial of injunctive relief in light of
plaintiffs’ demonstration of numerous violations of their constitutional rights.”
(citations omitted)).
197. State Police Consent Decree Information, STATE N.J. DEP’T LAW & PUB.
SAFETY, http://www.nj.gov/oag/decreehome.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2013).
198. Capital Punishment Act, ch. 111, 1982 N.J. Laws 555, amended by Act of Dec.
17, 2007, ch. 204, sec. 1, 2007 N.J. Laws 1427 (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:11-3 (West 2012)).
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case in New Jersey. Their astounding record is as follows: of 228
death penalty trials, 60 were sentenced to death, and 57 death
sentences were reversed on appeal.199 Eight condemned men
remained on death row when the Legislature’s Study commission
recommended repeal in 2007.200
No one was executed from
reinstatement to the day the Legislature repealed capital punishment
in December 2007, replacing execution with life imprisonment
without parole.201
Four members of the first PELS class of 1973 played critical roles
in the PD’s litigation response. Thomas Smith, as the First Assistant
Public Defender (and, from time to time, the Acting Public
Defender) ensured that the PD had the appropriate amount of
resources from the legislature to do the job, apportioned them
correctly and allocated staff to provide proper representation. Dale
Jones, who tried New Jersey’s first capital case, wore many hats
during that time, including trial work, training, supervising and,
ultimately, serving as the PD’s Director of Capital Litigation from
1984 to 2002. Lois DeJulio worked on the first capital case both on
trial and appeal and several thereafter and was regarded by many as
the “brains” of the operation. Paul Klein, who also handled capital
appeals, supervised and trained other attorneys who handled capital
appeals as well. Particularly worthy of mention is Leigh Bienen a
1974 graduate. She was the lead author of the landmark report for
the PD which led to the Supreme Court’s mandate of
“proportionality review.”202

199. See George W. Conk, Herald of Change: New Jersey’s Repeal of the Death
Penalty, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 21, 24 (2008); James R. Zazzali, The Dynamic
Interaction Between Courts, Legislature, and Public Opinion, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS.
J. 55, 58 (2008).
The heroic roles of the Office of the Public Defender and the heroic New Jersey
Supreme Court in its relentlessly conscientious review of every capital case can be
gleaned from the papers and proceedings of the Symposium, Legislation, Litigation,
Reflection & Repeal: The Legislative Abolition of the Death Penalty in New Jersey,
33 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1 (2008).
For New Jersey death penalty repeal resources, see Resources, SETON HALL L.,
http://law.shu.edu/About/News_Events/deathpenalty/Resources.cfm (last visited Oct.
10, 2012).
200. See NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMMISSION REPORT (2007),
available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/committees/dpsc_final.pdf.
201. See Zazzali, supra note 200, at 57.
202. See State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939 (N.J. 1988) (directing Attorney
General’s office to develop statewide capital case selection guidelines); DAVID C.
BALDUS, DEATH PENALTY PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW PROJECT: FINAL REPORT TO
THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT 22–24 (1991).
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The New Jersey courts took their mandate to avoid arbitrariness
with utmost earnestness and approached their task with scientific
rigor. In its mission to “save lives,” the Office of the Public Defender
commissioned a rigorous study to examine death penalty outcomes
across a spectrum of circumstances.203 The New Jersey Supreme
Court appointed Special Masters to determine if racial or other
impermissible disparities tainted the death sentences.204 The New
Jersey Supreme Court itself used what Justice Alan Handler (a death
penalty opponent) called “super due process”205 and Justice John
Wallace’s idea of exacting review—the idea that “when life hangs in
the balance error has no place.”206 This was a fusion of the lessons of
the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. It was this
process, not obstruction, as some detractors would argue, that led to
the lack of executions.
LOOKING BACK
The unique activism of Rutgers-Newark—a small state university
law school in an afflicted city—had a huge impact in the development
of the law. The activist faculty and the clinics engaged law students
deeply in innovative and intense litigation regarding the most
important and controversial issues of the day. Students at People’s
Electric learned the law-making function of the courts firsthand.
They often helped make that law. No other law school in the country
can begin to match its record in the 1970s. This was accomplished
without endowment, without a base of high ranking or wealthy
alumni, and without a tradition of such activism at the school. It was
merely a public law school whose tuition was nominal. Students
learned from the extraordinarily talented lawyers whom they assisted.
Their successes showed students how to succeed by really trying. We

203. See Leigh Bienen and Deborah Denno, The Reimposition of Capital
Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 RUTGERS L.
REV. 27 (1988).
204. See supra note 202; see also In re Proportionality Review Project (II), 757
A.2d 168 (N.J. 2000).
205. See, e.g., EVAN J. MANDERY, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A BALANCED
EXAMINATION 101, 104, 561, 570 (2005); ELIHU ROSENBLATT, CRIMINAL INJUSTICE
199, 200 (1996). Super due process refers to the additional rights afforded to
defendants in a capital case, beyond those afforded to defendants in a non-capital
proceeding, such as the possession of more appeal rights and the right to present
unlimited mitigating evidence.
206. State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 570 (2007) (Wallace, J., dissenting).
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left Rutgers confident that we knew how to, and could, change the
law, confident that we could make a difference.
Why Newark? First, the sixties and seventies were the high water
mark of public higher education. The two law schools of Rutgers—
Rutgers-Newark and Rutgers-Camden—were practically free, like
other leading public university systems such as those of New York,
California, and Michigan. We entered law school with no dread of
acquiring debt that would constrain our career choices. Confident in
American prosperity, our concerns as students were for meaningful
careers, not debt service. Struggling financially after graduation was
not a prospect we contemplated.
Second, the quiet leadership of Dean Willard Heckel brought
extraordinary talent to the law school and accommodated the
activism of the clinical professors highlighted in this essay. Of course,
there were professors who disapproved and who wished that the
school would become the small, elite academic model they
remembered as the Yale Law School from whence they came.207 Yet
those professors—Alex Brooks, David Haber, and Julius Cohen—
provided another side to the student experience—the scholarly
exactitude of the academic lawyer. Nothing about Rutgers made it a
bar-exam prep school of the sort that some today urge as a solution to
the high costs of “academic” law schools.208 In fact, I do not
remember anyone worrying about the bar exam. Although we could
take one-third of our credits in clinics, the first year core curriculum
was conventional, and so were the other offerings. So, the young
activists who disdained capitalism nonetheless learned Business
Associations, Evidence, Civil Procedure, and Remedies in lecture
classes where they read the same Langdellian casebooks as students
at the Ivy League schools did.
Third, the spirit of the times gave great confidence to reformist
litigators. Kinoy, Kunstler, and Stavis had experienced much success
in their work in the civil rights movement. They believed they could
reach and persuade the members of the United States Supreme
Court. When the Court began to retrench with the appointment of
the “Minnesota Twins”—Warren Burger and Harry Blackmun—the
activists doubled down.209 And time proved that they could. Stevens
207. See Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 781.
208. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012) for a survey of the
current crisis in legal education caused by its high cost.
209. See LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY
BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY (2006)
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and Blackmun eventually wore the mantle of the civil rights
movement heroes—Earl Warren and Louisiana’s “Mr. Republican”
John Minor Wisdom.210 Even Lewis Powell played a progressive role
at times, as in his concurring opinion in Bakke, which recognized
diversity as a key educational value. After his 1987 retirement, he
told law students that the only votes he regretted were upholding the
Georgia criminal sodomy statute in Bowers v. Hardwick211 and
McClesky v. Kemp,212 in which the Supreme Court upheld Georgia’s
death sentencing process as constitutional, despite overwhelming
evidence that killers with white victims were far more likely than
killers of black victims to be sentenced to death.213
Looking back at the many reported and landmark decisions in
which Rutgers professors and students participated, the alliance
between the ACLU and the Women’s Rights and Constitutional
Litigation Clinics stands out. In those days—before the invention of
the PC multiplied briefs like the axe of the sorcerer’s apprentice
multiplied brooms—key cases saw only a smattering of amicus briefs.
Often, the ACLU and the Clinics were the only non-parties who
participated. That pattern began to change in the late 1970s when
conservative public interest law firms began to emerge.214 Dramatic
change occurred in the Reagan era as the conservative movement
began to drive out the “RINOs”—Republican in Name Only—and
developed an ideological perspective on the law that was both more
conservative and more rigorous than the genteel conservatism of a
Lewis Powell.215 Later litigators faced fierce, intellectually powerful
conservatives like Antonin Scalia, who renounced the Warren Court.
The next generation of litigators faced in William Rehnquist, a Chief
210. See JOEL FRIEDMAN, CHAMPION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: JUDGE JOHN MINOR
WISDOM (2009)
211. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
212. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
213. See Joan Biskupic & Fred Barbash, Retired Justice Lewis Powell Dies at 90,
WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1998, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/
longterm/supcourt/stories/powell082698.htm; Ruth Marcus, Powell Regrets Backing
Sodomy Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1990, available at http://www.glapn.org/
sodomylaws/bowers/bonews05.htm.
214. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)
(upholding voluntary private affirmative action plan over dissents by Burger and
Rehnquist). Among the twenty-seven amicus curiae briefs were submissions
opposing affirmative action filed by Pacific Legal Foundation, Washington Legal
Foundation, Great Plains Legal Foundation and others who decried as impermissible
quotas of the voluntary plan to recruit black steelworkers.
215. See generally MICHAEL AVERY & DANIELLE MCLAUGHLIN, THE FEDERALIST
SOCIETY: HOW CONSERVATIVES TOOK THE LAW BACK FROM LIBERALS (2013).
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Justice more consistently conservative and more competent than
Warren Burger, who was only able to slow, and not reverse, the
progressive jurisprudence of the Warren Court.
Finally, credit must be given to the New Jersey Supreme Court.
New Jersey’s progressive jurisprudence began with the landmark
products liability case Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, which
introduced implied warranty of fitness for use to liability in tort for
defective products.216 In the 1970s, the New Jersey high court
embraced the call by its former member, Justice William Brennan, to
use state constitutionalism as an alternative to the foot-dragging of
the Burger Court.217 Brennan knew the potential in New Jersey
because he had served as a member of the judiciary committee of the
This path’s
1947 New Jersey Constitutional Convention.218
effectiveness was seen most dramatically in the education law cases of
Robinson v. Cahill and its progeny Abbott v. Burke. Like the
landmark zoning/open housing case Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,219 the educational law cases
continue to roil New Jersey politics, often along partisan lines.
Some have asked if there are any lessons for today’s law schools
and law students, who labor under the burden of the massive shift—
due to anti-tax sentiment—of the costs of higher education from the
public to the backs of students via the federal student loan system.
Can the circumstances that gave rise to Rutgers great successes be
replicated? No. But the principle of the public interest, that “we take
care of our own,” as Bruce Springsteen sings,220 can again, with
enough energy, will, wisdom, and good fortune rise to the forefront of
our thinking as a nation.
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(Columbia 2012).

